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COMMENT
Unveiling Inequality:
Burqa Bans and Nondiscrimination Jurisprudence at the
European Court of Human Rights
Over the past decade, Europe has been the site of strident debates over
integration and Islam. One major point of controversy is the trend toward
enacting legislation to prohibit Islamic veils from public places. Laws banning
face coverings, already in force in France and Belgium, are under consideration
in a number of European countries, including the Netherlands, Italy, and
Switzerland. Though few women in Europe wear the full veil,' the symbolic
and political stakes of the legislation are high.' The laws raise fundamental
questions about what it means to be French, Belgian, Dutch, or indeed
European. But the bans are of special interest for another reason: they provide
a likely testing ground for the nascent nondiscrimination jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights ("the Court") and a potential opportunity to
bolster legal safeguards against discrimination at the regional level.
Article 9 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention"), which protects the right to
religious freedom, has traditionally been the dominant analytical approach to
religious symbols in the public space in the Court's jurisprudence and the
academic literature. But previous cases concerning restrictions on religious
1. Statistics from 2009 placed the number of women wearing the veil in France at
approximately 1,900. Projet de loi interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans 'espace public
[Proposed Law Forbidding Concealing the Face in Public], ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE 5 (2oo),
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/pdf/projets/pl252o.pdf [hereinafter French Proposed
Law].
2. See Jennifer Heider, Unveiling the Truth Behind the French Burqa Ban: The Unwarranted
Restriction of the Right to Freedom ofReligion and the European Court ofHuman Rights, 22 IND.
INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 93, 97 (2012) (noting that "only 2,000 women in France actually wear
the burqa -an insignificant number given France has an estimated Muslim population of
five to six million" and that "the law is more symbolic than practical" (footnote omitted)).
1089
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
clothing have sharply narrowed that avenue for redress. This Comment argues,
however, that Article 14 nondiscrimination protections can fill that void. The
Court's Article 14 jurisprudence has long been criticized for its limited scope
and application, but a recent line of cases in the education context evinces the
emergence of a new doctrinal approach to discrimination. Properly applied and
reinforced, that case law could mature into a general analytical framework for
addressing the claims likely to arise from anti-burqa legislation and other
discriminatory measures.
This Comment proceeds in three Parts. Part I surveys national anti-burqa
laws promulgated or proposed in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. Part
II argues that Article 9 is a fundamentally inadequate mechanism for
addressing the key issues that burqa bans raise. Part III explores recent
developments in the Court's nondiscrimination jurisprudence and shows how
Article 14 might help resolve questions relating to burqa bans that Article 9
cannot address.
I. BANNING BUROAS
National bans on face coverings in public places have been in force in
France and Belgium since 2010 and 2011 respectively.' These bans establish
criminal penalties for appearing in public with one's face concealed.' Despite a
number of constitutional complaints against Belgium's burqa ban, the
country's Constitutional Court has rejected requests to suspend the law.s The
Netherlands has considered similar legislation.'
Although the bans are facially neutral, the legislative history and political
context of the laws suggest they were conceived precisely to address Islamic
3. Loi visant i interdire le port de tout vftement cachant totalement ou de manibre principale le
visage [Law Forbidding the Wearing of Any Clothing Covering the Face Completely or in a
Significant Manner] of June 1, 2011, MONITEURBELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium],
July 13, 2011, 41734; Loi 2010-1192 du n1 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage
dans l'espace public [Law 2010-1192 of October 11, 2010 on Forbidding Concealing the Face
in Public], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA PIPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF
FRANCE], Oct. 12, 2010, p. 18,344.
4. See sources cited supra note 3.
s. Cour Constitutionnelle [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision no 148/2011, Oct. 5, 2011,
http://www.const-court.be/public/f/2on1/2011-148f.pdf (Belg.).
6. Voorstel van wet, Instelling van een algemeen verbod op het dragen van gelaatsbedekkende
kleding [Proposal of Law, Establishing a General Ban on the Wearing of Face-Covering
Clothing], Tweede Kamer der Staten-General, Vergaderjaar 2011-2012, 33 165, nr. 2 (Neth.),




veils.' In the Netherlands, a proposed 2007 amendment to the Penal Code
would have specifically prohibited wearing the burqa or niqab in public.8 The
Council of State issued an advisory opinion finding that the proposal raised
free exercise and discrimination concerns under the national constitution and
the Convention.' A 2012 bill, perhaps in response to that opinion, does not
address specific types of face coverings.o
Similarly, during the drafting process in Belgium, one legislator proposed
that the law be renamed "Law Forbidding the Wearing of the Burqa or
Niqab."" Though the proposal was rejected," the legislative debates remained
focused on the perceived tension between the burqa and Belgian values."
7. See Gerhard van der Schyff & Adriaan Overbeeke, Exercising Religious Freedom in the Public
Space: A Comparative and European Convention Analysis of General Burqa Bans, 7 EUR. CONST.
L. REV. 424, 426, 432-35 (2003).
8. Voorstel van wet, Voorstel van de leden Wilders en Fritsma tot wijziging van het Wetboek
van Strafrecht in verband met een verbod op her dragen van boerka's of nikaabs in de
openbare ruimte (boerkaverbod) [Proposal of Law, Proposal by Mr. Wilders and Mr.
Fritsma To Amend the Penal Code in Connection with a Ban on the Wearing of Burqas or
Niqabs in the Public Space (Burqa Ban)], Tweede Kamer der Staten-General, Vergaderjaar
2006-2007, 31 1o8, nr. 2 (Neth.), https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-31lo8-2.pdf.
9. Advies Raad van State en reactie van de indieners, Voorstel van de leden Wilders en Fritsma
tot wijziging van het Wetboek van Strafrecht in verband met een verbod op het dragen van
boerka's of nikaabs in de openbare ruimte (boerkaverbod) [Advice of the Council of State
and Petitioners, Proposal by Mr. Wilders and Mr. Fritsma To Amend the Penal Code in
Connection with a Ban on the Wearing of Burqas or Niqabs in the Public Space (Burqa
Ban)], Tweede Kamer der Staten-General, Vergaderjaar 20o6-2007, 31 1o8, nr. 4,
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-31l08-4.pdf The Council of State is the
advisory body on legislation and the highest general administrative court in the
Netherlands; its key functions include providing independent policy, legal, and technical
analysis to the government and Parliament on legislation and governance. See generally The
Council of State, RAAD VAN STATE, http://www.raadvanstate.nVtheCouncil of state (last
visited Dec. 10, 2012) (describing the functions of the Council of State).
io. Dutch Proposal, supra note 6.
i. Amendements, Proposition de loi visant A interdire le port de tout v6tement cachant
totalement ou de manibre principale le visage [Amendments, Proposing a Lav Forbidding
the Wearing of Any Clothing Covering the Face Completely or in a Significant Manner],
Doc. 53 0219/003, Chambre des reprisentants de Belgique (Mar. 30, 2011),
http://www.lachambre.be/FLWB/PDF/53/o219/53Ko219oo3.pdf.
12. Rapport fait au nom de la Commission de l'Intirieur, des Affaires Gindrales et de la
Fonction Publique, Proposition de loi visant & interdire le port de tout vftement cachant
totalement ou de mani&re principale le visage [Report on Behalf of the Committee
on the Interior, General Affairs, and the Civil Service, Proposing a Law Forbidding the
Wearing of Any Clothing Covering the Face Completely or in a Significant Manner],
Doc. 53 0219/004, Chambre des reprisentants de Belgique, at 23 (Apr. 18, 2011),
http://www.dekamer.be/FLWB/pdf/53/0219/53Ko219oo4.pdf.
13. See, e.g., id. at 6 ("[I]l s'agit d'un d6bat fondamental sur la maniere dont on considere le
'vivre ensemble' en Belgique.... Le port d'un voile reprisente pour ... une rupture majeure
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Meanwhile, in France, the draft law purported to protect national security and
public order, noting that concealing the face may be "in certain circumstances,
a danger to public security."" But here, too, the legislative debate made clear
that the laws were designed to target the burqa and address the tension
between concealing the face and "'living together' in French society.""
Given the highly charged political climate surrounding the passage of the
bans, it is hardly surprising that challenges to the legislation have been brought
before national courts and regional tribunals, including the European Court of
Human Rights.
11. THE LIMITS OF ARTICLE 9
By criminalizing the decision to wear a burqa in public, these bans infringe
upon individuals' freedom to wear Islamic dress in manifestation of their
religious beliefs. One of the most natural methods for addressing the bans is
therefore the European Convention's protection of religious freedom under
Article 9." However, the Court's jurisprudence in a line of similar cases has
sharply limited the viability of Article 9 claims. Further, even if the Court were
to distinguish the bans from negative precedent, Article 9 remains a doctrinally
unsatisfying means to address the laws.
des principes fondamentaux de la socit6, de 'vivre ensemble', de civilit6 et de sociabilit6."
["It is a question of a fundamental debate on how 'living together' in Belgium is
regarded.... Wearing a veil represents a major departure from the fundamental principles
of society, of 'living together,' of civility, and of sociability."] (summarizing the remarks of
Catherine Fonck)); id. at 1o ("La Belgique a 6norm6ment investi dans l'6galit6 des hommes
et des femmes et a cr66 un Centre pour l'6galit6 des chances. En consequence, il est essentiel
que l'on puisse continuer dans la construction d'une socit6 d6mocratique par le dialogue et
la rencontre. Quelqu'un dont seuls les yeux sont visibles ne permet pas une dynamique
d6mocratique." ["Belgium has invested enormously in equality between men and women
and has created a Center for Equal Opportunity. Thus, it is essential that we be able to
continue constructing a democratic society through dialogue and contact. Someone who is
completely covered except for the eyes does not permit a democratic dynamic."]
(summarizing the remarks of Andr6 Frid6ric)).
14. French Proposed Law, supra note 1, at 4.
15. Id. at 3.
16. E.g., Expos6 des faits et Questions aux parties, S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 43835/11 (Eur.
Ct. H.R. filed Apr. ii, 2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=oo
-110063-
17. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 9, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention] (protecting religious freedom,
including manifestation of religious belief, subject to restrictions "prescribed by law and []
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public




Burqa bans are not the Court's first encounter with laws restricting Islamic
dress. Legal challenges to regulations forbidding conspicuous religious
symbols -including Islamic headscarves'8 -from public institutions have
proceeded chiefly under Article 9." In those cases, the Court deferred to
national governments, declining to find Article 9 violations. The result is a
significant precedential obstacle to successful challenges to burqa bans under
Article 9. In Dahlab v. Switzerland, the Court declared inadmissible a teacher's
Article 9 claim, explaining that students' right to a secular environment in a
state school justified prohibiting instructors from wearing headscarves.2 o Four
years later, in Sahin v. Turkey, the Court upheld a regulation forbidding
students from attending lectures or examinations while wearing headscarves
against an Article 9 claim." In reaching this decision, the Court noted the
absence of consensus among member states concerning the relationship
between religion and society, and particularly on the wearing of symbols in
educational institutions." Based on Sahin, the Court has also upheld school
rules banning headscarves from physical education classes" and from all
classes. 4
The Court's approach in the headscarf cases conforms to the doctrine of the
margin of appreciation. This doctrine is rooted in the Court's recognition that
national governments are often better placed than international judges to
decide whether limitations on individual rights are justified in light of a
particular state's political and social context." The degree of deference accorded
a national government-the width of the margin-depends on whether the
is. See, e.g., Emelie A. Olson, Muslim Identity and Secularism in Contemporary Turkey: "The
Headscarf Dispute," 58 ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 161 (1985); Ellen Wiles, Headscarves, Human
Rights, and Harmonious Multicultural Society: Implications of the French Ban for Interpretations
ofEquality, 41 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 699 (2007).
ig. See, e.g., Dogru v. France, App. No. 27058/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2008), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int
/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-90039; Kervanciv. France, App. No. 31645/04 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. 20o8); Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2005),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=00-70956; Dahlab v. Switzerland,
App. No. 42393/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2001), http://hudoc.echr.coe.invsites/eng/pages
/search.aspx ?i=001-22643.
20. Dahlab, App. No. 42393/98, 123.
21. Sahin, App. No. 44774/98.
22. Id. 109.
23. Dogru, App. No. 27058/05; Kervanci, App. No. 31645/04.
24. Aktas v. France, App. No. 43563/08 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites
/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=oo-61055 (declaring the applicant's claim inadmissible).
25. For an overview of the genesis of and justifications for the margin of appreciation doctrine,
and a critique of its application to the headscarf cases, see Raffaella Nigro, The Margin of
Appreciation Doctrine and the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights on the Islamic
Veil, 11 HUM. RTs. REv. 531 (2010).
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challenged measure has a legitimate aim and is necessary in a democratic
society. Legitimacy and necessity may be reflected in the level of consensus
among member states of the Council of Europe on the particular issue.27 When
there is no uniform practice, the Court tends to leave the matter to national
*,8discretion.
The Court consistently recognized a wide margin of appreciation in the
headscarf cases. That approach has attracted stinging criticism 29 for its
vagueness3o and lack of nuance," both of which may betray an overly
politicized view of the veil and its fraught relationship with secular values.32 In
the absence of sustained analysis of how the right of Muslim women to wear
the headscarf interferes with the rights and freedoms of others, or of the
question of the incompatibility of the Islamic veil and secularism, the
consequence of the Court's reliance on the margin of appreciation has been "a
clear perception of the Islamic veil as the symbolic enemy of democracy in
Europe."" Similar tensions in the debates over the burqa make the
transposition of the Court's sweeping approach a real possibility, threatening
to foreclose successful Article 9 challenges to the legislation.
Of course, burqa bans do differ in important ways from headscarf
regulations. Previous cases concerned regulations that were limited to schools
or public establishments; the new laws apply in all public places. Indeed, in
Arslan v. Turkey, the Court specifically distinguished a general ban on religious
26. See Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 22-23,
48-49 (1976).
27. See id. at 21-24, 47-50 (1976) (articulating the margin of appreciation doctrine); see also
Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6538/74, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (set. A) at 35-37,
59 (1979) (elaborating upon the role of regional consensus in determining the degree of
discretion granted to national authorities).
28. Nigro, supra note 25, at 533.
29. See id. at 542.
30. See, e.g., Natan Lerner, How Wide the Margin ofAppreciation? The Turkish Headscarf Case, the
Strasbourg Court, and Secularist Tolerance, 13 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & DisP. RESOL. 65, 83
(2005) ("[r]he Court did not . .. compare the social risk involved in using a religious
symbol on the university campus with the blow inflicted to the freedom to manifest religion
by the comprehensive prohibition."); Cindy Skach, International Decisions: Sahin v. Turkey;
"Teacher Headscarf' Case, ioo Am. J. INT'L L. 186, 192 (2006) (criticizing the reasoning in
Sahin as "thin and unsatisfying").
31. See Nigro, supra note 25, at 544.
32. E.g., Isabelle Rorive, Religious Symbols in the Public Space: In Search of a European Answer, 30
CARDozo L. REv. 2669, 2697 (2009); Christopher D. Belelieu, Note, The Headscarf as
Symbolic Enemy of the European Court of Human Rights' Democratic Jurisprudence: Viewing
Islam Through a European Legal Prism in Light of the Sahin Judgment, 12 CoLUM. J. EUR. L.
573, 617 (2oo6).




dress in public from regulations on religious symbols in public
establishments? While the interest in preserving religious neutrality in schools
or the civil service could be seen to supersede the right to the manifestation of
religious belief, that interest is less compelling where a ban applies in all public
spaces. Determining that a narrower margin should apply to bans covering all
public spaces," the Arslan Court found an Article 9 violation. Applying this
logic to generally applicable burqa bans might result in a finding of a similar
violation of the Convention.
But although Arslan presents grounds for cautious optimism for future
Article 9 challenges to burqa bans, the decision may be narrow in scope. Arslan
turned on the fact that Turkey had not offered persuasive arguments that such
broad restrictions were "necessary in a democratic society;" thus, the Court
concluded, the restrictions could not qualify as an exception to Article 9's
protection of religious freedom. 6 While Turkey cited secularism and the
prevention of "acts of provocation, proselytism, and propaganda" to justify the
regulation," the government had not provided real evidence of abuse or
proselytizing in public." The Court, however, left open the possibility that
sufficient factual evidence could support a general ban," though it stopped
short of describing what evidence would suffice. Given the dominance of
margin of appreciation analysis in the Court's jurisprudence, this opening may
result in deference to national governments in future cases. Article 9 thus
presents a possible but ultimately limited vehicle through which to challenge
burqa bans.
More fundamentally, even a successful finding of an Article 9 violation
would skirt the issues at the heart of the bans. The freedom to wear the veil is
certainly, at least for some women, a genuine question of religious
manifestation, but it is also steeped in symbolism and sociopolitical meaning
that extend far beyond religious freedom. The issue centers on competing
visions of equality and social participation. The bans can be seen as either a
society's rejection of the oppressive practices that the full veil has come to
34. Arslan v. Turkey, App. No. 41135/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites
/eng/pages/search.aspx?i= oo-97380.
3s. Id. 49.
36. European Convention, supra note 17, art. 9, § 2 (permitting limitations on the right to
religious freedom that are "prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society"); see
also Arslan, App. No. 41135/98, 'l 44-52 (considering and finding unpersuasive Turkey's
arguments as to the necessity of the regulation).
37. Arslan, App. No. 41135/98, 49.
38. Id. 51.
39. Malcolm D. Evans, From Cartoons to Crucifixes: Current Controversies Concerning the Freedom
of Religion and the Freedom of Expression Before the European Court of Human Rights, 26 J.L.
& RELIGION 345, 367-68 (2010-2011).
1095
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
represent or a reflection of deep societal currents of exclusion and intolerance.
With both sides laying claim to the banner of nondiscrimination, Article 9
cannot fully address the key terms of the debate and the most troubling
implications of the new legislation.
III. THE PROMISE OF ARTICLE 14?
A more suitable vehicle for judicial engagement with the dominant
discourse surrounding burqa bans may be found in an unlikely source: the
Convention's nondiscrimination provision, Article 14. That provision states
that "[t]he enjoyment of rights and freedoms set forth in th[e] Convention
shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race,
colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status." 4o
Although the Court's nondiscrimination jurisprudence is comparatively
underdeveloped, recent developments in its approach to Article 14 signal new
analytical possibilities.
Commentators have described Article 14 as "parasitic," pointing out its
basic structural "weaknesses."4 1 The Court itself has long stated that "Article 14
has no independent existence."4 ' Because Article 14 protects "[t]he enjoyment
of the rights and freedoms set forth in th[e] Convention,"" the Court hears
Article 14 claims only in conjunction with claims of violations of other
Convention provisions.' Although the success of a nondiscrimination claim
does not hinge on the merits of the underlying claim,45 in practice, the Court
40. European Convention, supra note 17, art. 14.
41. Rory O'Connell, Cinderella Comes to the Ball: Art 14 and the Right to Non-Discrimination in the
ECHR, 29 LEGAL STUD. 211, 212 (2009).
42. Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, App. No. 72881/01, 20o6-XI Eur. Ct. H.R.
1, 30, 100 (20o6).
43. European Convention, supra note 17, art. 14 (emphasis added).
44. PHILIP LEACH, TAKING A CASE TO THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 399 (3d ed.
2011). Recognizing the limited scope of Article 14, the Steering Committee for Human
Rights drafted an additional Protocol to the Convention, which removes the limitation to
Convention rights. However, only eighteen member states have ratified the Protocol to date.
Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, COUNCIL OF EUR., http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig
.asp?NT=177&CM=7&DF=o3/o6/2o12&CL=ENG (last updated Mar. 6, 2012). It thus
remains a limited vehicle for redressing discrimination claims. See Samantha Besson,
Evolutions in Non-Discrimination Law Within the ECHR and the ESC Systems: It Takes Two To
Tango in the Council ofEurope, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 147, 162 (2012).
45. Thlimmenos v. Greece, App. No. 34369/97, 20oo-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 263, 278, 40 (2000);
Rasmussen v. Denmark, App. No. 8777/79, 87 Eur. Ct. H.R. (set. A) at 12, 29 (1984)




often declines to consider Article 14 allegations after deciding the principal
claim.*6 The Court often applies Article 14 in a narrow fashion, drawing an
artificial distinction between "direct" and "indirect" discrimination claims-i.e.,
formal discrimination versus disparate impact-and generally preferring to
address only the former. Nothing in the text of Article 14 precludes indirect
discrimination claims, but vagueness in the Court's concept of indirect
discrimination has made such arguments difficult to articulate and substantiate
in practice.47
A recent line of cases, however, represents an important shift in the Court's
approach to Article 14.48 The Court has long alluded to the possibility of
proving discrimination through evidence of disproportionate effects of facially
neutral measures.4 ' But in 2007, for the first time, the Court recognized
explicitly-and articulated a clear test for-an Article 14 violation on the
ground of indirect discrimination.
The applicants in D.H. v. Czech Republic challenged the Czech
government's practice of placing Roma children in special schools.so In the
absence of an official policy of discriminatory placement, the applicants
presented statistics showing that Roma children were far more likely than
other students to be placed in special schools and, thus, were systematically
underlying Convention provisions] . . . there can be no room for its application unless the
facts at issue fall within the ambit of one or more of the latter." (citation omitted)); see also
ODDNY MjOLL ARNARD6TTIR, EQUALITY AND NON-DSCRIMINATION UNDER THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 35-36 (2003) (describing the "autonomous meaning but
accessory scope" ofArticle 14).
46. E.g., Metro. Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, App. No. 45701/99, 200l-XII Eur. Ct. H.R.
82, 120, 134 (2001) ("[T]he allegations relating to Article 14 of the Convention amount to a
repetition of those submitted under Article 9. Accordingly, there is no cause to examine
them separately."); cf Giitl v. Austria, App. No. 49686/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2009),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-91724 (holding that Austria
violated Article 14 and finding it unnecessary to consider the underlying Article 9 claim);
Thlimmenos, App. No. 34369/97 (finding a violation of Article 14 and declining to address
the Article 9 claim).
47. See ARNARD6TTIR, supra note 45, at 79-84.
48. See Jennifer Devroye, The Case of D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic, 7 Nw. U. J. HUM.
RTs. 81, 81 (2009) (describing the case as a "landmark decision").
49. See, e.g., Zarb Adami v. Malta, App. No. 17209/02, 20o6-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 305; Jordan v.
United Kingdom, App. No. 24746/94, 2ool-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 537, 154,
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-59450 (finding no violation of
Article 14); Thlimmenos, App. No. 34369/97; see also Hoogendijk v. Netherlands, App. No.
58641/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2005), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i
=oo-68064 (finding the applicant's claim inadmissible).
50. D.H. v. Czech Republic, App. No. 57325/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2007), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int
/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i= 001-83256.
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denied access to higher quality education in mainstream schools." In a
significant break from previous cases," the Court accepted those statistics as
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. The burden then shifted to
the government to show that the "difference in the impact of the legislation
was the result of objective factors unrelated to ethnic origin."s The government
asserted that the special-school system was intended to serve the needs of
students with special needs. While the Court recognized that aim as legitimate,
it was not persuaded that the differential treatment of Roma children sent to
the special schools was justifieds4  or that the means - de facto racial
segregation-were proportionate to that aim. It therefore found a violation of
Article 14 in conjunction with the right to education under Article 2 of Protocol
No. 1,ss holding that the applicants had been subject to discrimination with
respect to their enjoyment of the right to education.
Subsequent cases have built upon the D.H. decision, offering insight into
the Court's developing approach to indirect discrimination cases. They confirm
that statistical evidence, though useful, is not required to show a prima facie
case of discrimination and to shift the burden to the government to provide
objective and reasonable justifications for the discriminatory measures in
question. In Sampanis v. Greece,6 the Court found that Greece had violated
Article 14 in conjunction with Article 2 of Protocol No. i by failing to provide
adequate schooling for Roma children, placing them in special classes located
away from the main school building. Noting that these classes included only
Roma children, the Court found sufficient evidence to establish a presumption
of discrimination" and was unpersuaded by the government's efforts to show
objective justifications for the policy.s"
51. Id. 5 134.
52. Cf Jordan, App. No. 24746/94, 154 (finding that statistics alone are insufficient to establish
discrimination under Article 14).
53. D.H., App. No. 57325/00, 184.
54. The Court noted that the aptitude tests the government used were of dubious objectivity
and that parental consent was also insufficient.
ss. Article 2 of Protocol No. I to the European Convention, opened for signature Mar. 20, 1952,
213 U.N.T.S. 262, 264, protects the right to education and the right of parents to ensure
teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions.
s6. Sampanis v. Greece, App. No. 32526/o5, 68 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2008), http://hudoc
.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-86797.
57. Id. 77-83-
s8. The Court noted that no reliable or objective tests had been conducted to determine which
students to place in the special classes. Id. 89-90. Moreover, although the stated purpose
for the special classes was to prepare the students for reentry into mainstream education,




Most recently, in Orin v. Croatia," the Court found that the statistics
submitted on the general enrollment of Roma and non-Roma children in two
schools did not show an official policy of automatically placing Roma children
in separate classes. In only one of the two schools at issue were a majority of
Roma children placed in a Roma-only class."o The Court found that this did
not constitute sufficient prima facie evidence of discrimination. Nevertheless,
the Court noted that the policy of placing students in separate classes based on
an insufficient command of Croatian had been applied only to Roma children,
which indicated a difference in treatment.6 ' The Court thus appears willing to
accept evidence of a pattern or practice of discriminatory action resulting from
facially neutral measures, even if that evidence does not amount to reliable
statistical proof of a general government policy of discrimination.
While these important cases arose in the education context, the Court's
reasoning in D.H. and its progeny suggests a promising new approach to cases
involving discrimination, including those involving religious freedom. Of
course, it is possible the Court might decline to extend the reasoning of the
education cases to other contexts. The Orful Court took care to note the
"specific position of the Roma population" as a highly vulnerable minority
group.6 While Muslims in Europe have faced significant prejudice, their level
of disadvantage differs qualitatively from the racism and pervasive deprivation
the Roma have experienced. Furthermore, the controversy surrounding the
burqa bans might dissuade the Court from jurisprudential innovations in the
religious freedom context. These factors may push the Court to assess the bans
on pure Article 9 grounds rather than extend its new nondiscrimination
jurisprudence.6 3
But D.H. did not emerge in a vacuum. In articulating for the first time a
test for indirect discrimination, the Court in D.H. explicitly invoked an existing
and well-developed body of law in the European Community. It drew upon
European Directives from the late 1990s and early 2000s prohibiting indirect
sex or race discrimination, as well as European Court of Justice case law
recognizing the concept of indirect discrimination as early as the 1970S.6




62. Id. 15 147-148.
63. The Court often declines to consider Article 14 claims after deciding on the merits of the
underlying Convention violation. See supra note 45-46.
64. See D.H. v. Czech Republic, App. No. 57325/00, 81-91 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2007),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=oo1-83256 (giving an overview of
relevant European Community law and practice, including instruments established in the
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Moreover, scholars have noted that the Court has expanded the reach of its
general nondiscrimination jurisprudence in recent years, deciding cases on
domestic violence, religious instruction in schools, and family life in terms of
nondiscrimination principles." Expanding the recognition of indirect
discrimination beyond the education context would accord with these
jurisprudential trends.
Equally important, the education cases set forth an analytical framework
that can easily be transposed to other Article 14 cases. An Article 14 challenge
to a national burqa ban would allege discrimination on the basis of religion
with respect to the applicant's Article 9 right to religious freedom.' Based on
Oriul, a showing that the laws have been virtually exclusively enforced against
Muslims, such as through statistics showing that a majority of prosecutions
involve Muslim women, would establish a prima facie case of differential
treatment." The burden would then shift to the respondent state to show a
legitimate aim and proportionate means for the differential treatment.
1990s prohibiting indirect sex discrimination, and European Court of Justice case law
articulating the principles of indirect discrimination); Besson, supra note 44, at 164 (" [T]he
[European Committee on Social Rights's] and the ECHR's decisions on indirect
discrimination ... have developed by reference to each other.").
65. Marta Cartabia, The European Court of Human Rights: Judging Nondiscrimination, 9 INT'L J.
CONST. L. 8o8 (2011); Carmelo Danisi, How Far Can the European Court ofHuman Rights Go
in the Fight Against Discrimination? Defining New Standards in Its Nondiscrimination
Jurisprudence, 9 INT'LJ. CONST. L. 793,795 (2011).
66. Although Dogru was decided after D.H., the applicant filed the complaint in 2005, before the
Court's articulation of the concept of indirect discrimination. Dogru v. France, App. No.
27058/05, I (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2008), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx
?i=001-90039. This likely explains why the applicant did not plead-and the Court did not
evaluate - the case in terms of Article 14.
67. Alternatively, applicants could assert gender discrimination with respect to Article 9 religious
freedom. The two strategies would be largely identical in form, particularly if the law
challenged is facially neutral. A religious discrimination argument would be simpler, in part
because the Court found inadmissible a gender discrimination claim in Dahlab v.
Switzerland, App. No. 42393/98, 2001-V Eur Ct. H.R. 447, 457, 464 (2001). Moreover, that
one main justification for prohibiting the burqa is to combat gender discrimination might
undermine or at least contradict a gender-based argument.
68. Data on enforcement is sparse, but the Ministry of the Interior announced that, in the year
since the law came into force, 354 checks had been conducted, resulting in
299 citations. Cyrille Vanlerberghe, Premier anniversaire de la loi sur le voile intigral, LiE
FIGARO (Apr. 11, 2012, 3:02 PM), http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2012/04/11
/olo16-20120411ARTFIGoo473-premier-anniversaire-de-la-loi-sur-le-voile-integral.php. There
were no official indications as to the proportion of those enforcement actions conducted
against women wearing burqas. An independent organization reported that 367 women had
been cited and interrogated, suggesting that the vast majority of enforcement actions have
been against veiled women. See i1 avril 2012 a nlh3o devant I'Assemble nationale: Bilan de la




Prior Article 14 cases indicate that while legitimate-aim analysis is often
deferential, the Court has been willing to subject state action to more searching
review when considering the proportionality of the measures at issue.69 The
Court's recent indirect discrimination cases have inquired closely into the
justifications offered by governments in defense of allegedly discriminatory
measures. In D.H., the Court questioned the reliability of the tests used to
assign children to schools and weighed the validity of parental consent to the
discriminatory assignments .7 The Court employed a similar approach in
Sampanis, evincing a willingness to examine the details and structure of the
programs in question; in Orsa, it conducted a stringent analysis of procedural
safeguards." For burqa bans, even presuming some legitimate aim-such as
protecting public security or preserving social equality and dignity -the Court
could still find that the bans are not necessary and are therefore
disproportionate. For instance, instead of a blanket ban, a state could instead
require individuals to temporarily remove their veil upon request for security
checks. Further, although in some cases banning the full veil may allow women
coerced into covering themselves to participate in society as equal citizens,
other women wear the full veil voluntarily. Banning the veil from public spaces
might undermine women's dignity and result in isolating some women from
society. The bans therefore cannot be necessary to protect women's equality
and dignity.
There remains a lurking danger that the margin of appreciation doctrine"
may encroach on the Court's review of the merits of Article 14 claims. In
contrast to the notion of equal access to education, which formed the
foundation of the education cases, the relationship between the state and
religion is far more contested. Given the lack of consensus among member
states about that relationship73 and the heavily politicized nature of the debates
http://touchepasamaconstitution.wordpress.com/2012/o4/11/i1-avril-2012-a-lih3o-devant
-lassemblee-nationale-bilan-de-la-loi-anti-niqab-un-an-apres.
69. See Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas v. Austria, App. No. 40825/98, 5 98
(Eur. Ct. H.R. 2008), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=oo-88022;
Thlimmenos v. Greece, App. No. 34369/97, 2000-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 263, 279, 47 (2000).
70. D.H. v. Czech Republic, App. No. 57325/00, 5 199-204 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2007),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=oo-83256.
71. See also Zarb Adami v. Malta, App. No. 17209/02, 20o6-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 305, 326, 82
(expressing doubt as to the Maltese government's stated justifications for the discrepancy in
the distribution of mandatory jury service between men and women and finding a violation
of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 4 § 3(d)).
72. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., Cha'are Shalom ve Tsedek v. France, App. No. 27417/95, 2ooo-VII Eur. Ct. H.R.
231, 259, 84 (2000) (applying a wide margin of appreciation "with regard to establishment
of the delicate relations between the Churches and the State").
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over the burqa, the Court might fall back on the margin of appreciation as a
way to avoid making legal decisions with undesirable political consequences.
The margin of appreciation problem is endemic to the Court's jurisprudence,
and how best to cabin it can perhaps only be determined through a systemic
inquiry into the proper balance of authority and responsibility between the
Court and the member states.
But the text of the Convention does suggest a preliminary limiting
principle. Whereas other substantive Convention provisions, including Article
9, contain explicit subsections carving out exceptions for measures "necessary
for a democratic society," Article 14 contains no such language. To the extent
that the margin of appreciation- already a judge-made doctrine with no
textual basis in the Convention itself-enjoys even less textual support in the
Article 14 context, the Court should decline to employ it as a means of avoiding
or concealing politically sensitive decisions, particularly in the area of
nondiscrimination.
CONCLUSION
Burqa bans present a distinct doctrinal challenge for the Court. They chafe
against the limits of Article 9, which has always been an inadequate mechanism
to address what critics find most troubling about these laws. It is difficult to
ignore the bans' potential for exclusion and marginalization, even as they are
brandished as a key to equality and liberation from oppression. Whether the
Court will see the bans as an occasion to fill in the Article 14 mechanism it has
begun to sketch may ultimately involve difficult political and normative
judgments about the Court's institutional role. Nonetheless, a workable Article
14 jurisprudence would provide a more substantively satisfying means of
approaching the difficult questions at the heart of the legislation. A vital
nondiscrimination framework is both desirable and necessary to ensure that
member states comply with their human rights obligations under the
Convention. Foundations for that framework should not be left fallow.
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